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Accountability for Tortious Conduct
- Judge Hopkins Parses the Law -
JOSEPHINE Y. KING*
Preface
What, after all, is tort law? It is social legislation, whether
derived from the common law or statute. Dean Prosser with his
typical felicity of expression commented: "Perhaps more than
any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a battleground of
social theory."' Public policy plays a prominent role in the solu-
tion of private disputes, the civil wrongs which constitute the
substance of tort cases. "There is good reason, therefore, to
make a conscious effort to direct the law along lines which will
achieve a desirable social result, both for the present and for the
future."2
This goal is particularly meaningful in the light of recent
developments in the law of New York. During the 1960's, much
of the state's law was recodified; foremost among these modern-
izations was the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.3 The
difficult task of recasting notions of civil accountability in the
context of liberalized adjective law fell to the judges of this pe-
riod. Thus, a survey of precedential decisions in the torts field
cannot be artificially isolated from their restructured procedural
framework.
This, however, is not a novel observation. A century ago, Sir
Henry Maine detected that "substantive law has at first the look
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the cooperation of members of the Pace
Law Review in preparing this article, and in particular, the indispensable assistance of
John Hearn.
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 14-15 (4th ed. 1971).
2. Id. at 15.
3. The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, repealing and replacing the Civil
Practice Act and the Rules of Civil Practice, became effective September 1, 1963. N.Y.
Civ. PEc. LAW & R. (McKinney).
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of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."4 To-
day, that fact must still be acknowledged. Accordingly, in exam-
ining Judge Hopkins' contributions in tort law, one must appre-
ciate the fact that he concurrently confronted revision of long
established rules of practice which had suspended or frozen the
substantive law in a rigid mold.
A review of selected decisions in the field of tort law yields
an imperfect and inadequate representation of Judge Hopkins'
contributions over the past two decades. But the selection has
been consciously directed to illustrate solutions to issues of prac-
tical importance to lawyers and judges. These are not the sim-
plest of cases demanding a minimum of judicial ability; rather,
they challenge the adjudicator to draw fully upon his skills of
statutory construction and interpretation, his knowledge of the
law past and present, his powers of reasoning and his ability to
clarify and refine the law.
Part I of this commentary confirms the focus on difficult ar-
eas of the law by addressing the nettlesome issues of joint
tortfeasors and apportionment. Part II explores the confluence
of two currents of change, Dole apportionment and intrafamily
immunity, which do not course at the same velocity. Part III
confronts the enigmas of statutes of limitation and the substan-
tive issue of accrual of claims. The conclusion, that Judge Hop-
kins has advanced the integrity and the responsiveness of the
law in all of these areas, necessarily follows.
I. Apportionment and Joint Tortfeasors
A. Approach of the Common Law
The dispensation of justice in consonance with the accepted
mission of modern tort adjudication necessitates a fine balancing
of rights, obligations and relationships of individuals. In centu-
ries past, the historic approach to personal injury was to "let the
loss lie where it falls." When the law recognized just compensa-
tion of the innocent victim as a legitimate objective it exhibited
no concern with degrees of fault; it did not measure the compar-
ative negligence of a plaintiff and a defendant, or the propor-
tionate contribution of each of several defendants to the injury
4. H. MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1886).
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inflicted upon a plaintiff. The simplistic solution of the common
law was to bar recovery if the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent. Where multiple tortfeasors caused the injury, the plaintiff
could select one and sue him for full compensation. If he sued
two or all tortfeasors, he could enforce his judgment against any
one of them. The choice in framing the tort action and in the
strategy of final recovery was plaintiff's.
The predicament of the hapless defendant selected by the
plaintiff from among two or more tortfeasors implicated in the
wrong can be traced to a departure from the original concept of
substantively joint (concerted) tortfeasors. The joint and several
liability5 which had previously attached to conspiratorial wrong-
doersO was now transposed to independent actors whose conduct
converged to produce plaintiff's injury. Thus, the plaintiff could
bring an action against one, some or all of "several" tortfeasors
and execute a judgment in full against any one of those he sued.
Augmenting the joined tortfeasor's misfortune was applica-
tion of the common law rule against contribution between or
among tortfeasors.7 Contribution where allowed was usually de-
termined by dividing the total recovery by the number of
tortfeasors against whom the plaintiff obtained judgment.8 Al-
though the rule originated in a case involving intentional con-
certed wrongdoing, it was subsequently extended by American
courts to bar contribution among independent actors whose neg-
ligence concurred in a single harm.9 Thus one of several proce-
durally-joined tortfeasors was not entitled to a sharing of the
damages assessed.
5. "Joint" tortfeasors originally denoted persons engaged in concerted action or a
common enterprise causing a single injury; all were responsible for the same tort giving
rise to one cause of action. "Several" tortfeasors acted independently but concurrently to
cause a single harm; each could be the object of a separate cause of action. See J. FLEM-
ING, THE LAW OF TORTS 237-39 (5th ed. 1977); PROSSER, supra note 1, at 291-97.
6. Professors Fleming and Prosser refer to Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5,
77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613) for the rule of joint liability: "all coming [together] to do an
unlawful act, and of one party, the act of one is the act of all of the same party being
present." FLEMING, supra note 5, at 237; PROSSER, supra note 1, at 291.
7. The rule is traced to Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See
PROSSEa, supra note 1, at 305-06.
8. See generally Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S.
CAL. L. REV. 728 (1968) (analysis of traditional loss allocation alternatives).
9. See generally Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413
(1936-37) (discussion of ramifications of joinder of defendants in tort actions).
19831.
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Neither could the defendant seek indemnification by im-
pleading a person not a party who might be liable to him for all
or part of plaintiff's claim, despite the language of the impleader
statute.10 Indemnification, in contrast to contribution, repre-
sented a shifting of liability. New York followed the common
law rule that recognized a right of indemnity only when a party
could shift the entire loss to another." In tort actions, a defen-
dant might be permitted to implead a third party only if the
defendant's negligence was passive or secondary and the third
party's negligence was active or primary. So far as tortfeasors
were concerned, the law, in effect, declared "a pox on all of you."
B. Recent Evolution of New York Law
From this posture of indifference to equities among wrong-
doers to the present approach of comparative fault and appor-
tionment, three developments in New York law marked the
transition. First, the Civil Practice Law and Rules permitted
contribution among tortfeasors against whom plaintiff obtained
a joint money judgment."2 In 1974, the legislature modified the
rule to allow a claim of contribution "whether or not an action
has been brought or a judgment has been rendered."' Second,
10. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1007 (McKinney 1976). See Fox v. Western New York
Motor Lines, 257 N.Y. 305, 308, 178 N.E. 289, 290 (1931). This restriction was modified
in Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175,
180, 15 N.E.2d 567, 568-69 (1938) and McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y.
314, 327-28, 107 NE.2d 463, 470-71 (1952).
11. Indemnity is "not dependent upon the legislative will. It springs from a contract,
express or implied, and full, not partial, reimbursement is sought." McFall v. Compagnie
Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. at 328, 107 N.E.2d at 471. See also Insurance Co. of North
Am. v. Dayton Tool and Die Works, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 489, 497-98, 443 N.E.2d 457, 460-61,
457 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212-13 (1982); Green Bus Lines, Inc. v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 74
A.D.2d 136, 149, 426 N.Y.S.2d 981, 990 (2d Dep't 1980).
12. See former N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 1401 (McKinney); 1964 N.Y. Laws, ch. 388, §
5 (McKinney).
13. 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 742, § 1, codified in N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1401 (McKinney
1976). The current provision reads:
§ 1401. Claim for contribution
Except as provided in section 15-108 of the general obligations law, two or more
persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury, in-
jury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among them whether
or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered against the
person from whom contribution is sought.
Id. The language of § 1401 parallels the text of the Uniform Contribution Among
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/9
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the legislature of New York in 1975 enacted a comparative negli-
gence statute eliminating contributory negligence as a total bar
to plaintiff's recovery.' 4 Third, the New York Court of Appeals
in 1972 formulated a theory of apportionment of damages in
Dole v. Dow -Chemical Co., 15 which the legislature reflected in
amending the Civil Practice Law and Rules:
§ 1402. Amount of contribution
The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled shall be
the excess paid by him over and above his equitable share of the
judgment recovered by the injured party; but no person shall be
required to contribute an amount greater than his equitable
share. The equitable shares shall be determined in accordance
with the relative culpability of each person liable for
contribution."
In the aggregate, these three developments formalized by
statute within the space of a mere decade, overturned some of
the basic, time-honored rules governing accountability for tor-
tious conduct. The comparative negligence statute, although not
a focus of this article, must be acknowledged as a fundamental
change in the substantive law of New York, distinctively ad-
vantaging plaintiffs. By contrast, the Dole decision and sections
1401 and 1402 speak to the equities among defendants. 7 Be-
Tortfeasors Act § 1(a).
14. 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 69, § 1, codified in N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney
1976):
§ 1411. Damages recoverable when contributory negligence or assumption of risk
is established
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or
wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the dece-
dent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar recov-
ery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the
proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or decedent
bears to the culpable conduct which caused the damages.
Id.
15. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
16. 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 742, § 1, codified in N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 1402 (McKinney
1976).
17. That Dole apportionment adjusts rights and obligations of contribution among
defendants and does not aid the plaintiff is exemplified in the complex factual and
pleading patterns of Klinger v. Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d 362, 361 N.E.2d 974, 393 N.Y.S.2d 323
(1977). Plaintiffs sued several defendants who in turn impleaded a number of persons as
third party defendants. After obtaining a judgment prescribing the proportionate share
of liability for each prime and impleaded defendant, plaintiffs recovered only a small
1983]
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cause of its complexity and penchant for infiltrating a great di-
versity of tort claims, the apportionment doctrine and its sup-
porting rationale command special attention.
But it would deceptively shade the truth to depict the Dole
decision as bolting upon the scene without warning and justifica-
tion. The rational evolution of the law does not work its way in
that manner. Precursory reasoning in analytic opinions pre-dat-
ing Dole supplied the transition. Foremost of the decisions, not
surprisingly, was Judge Hopkins' application of the law in
Musco v. Conte.1 8
C. Musco v. Conte
The pertinent facts of this case reveal that defendant Conte,
while attempting to park his car in a lot maintained by a diner,
overshot a wooden log backstop demarcating the parking area.
Musco, responding to defendant's request for assistance to extri-
cate the automobile, sustained injury to his hand by virtue of
Conte's negligence. He was taken to Yonkers General Hospital
where surgery was performed. The negligent administration of
anesthesia resulted in Musco's death.
19
Musco's administratrix brought a wrongful death action
against Conte and the owner and operator of the parking lot,
alleging negligence of the defendants. Approximately seven years
after the accident and five years subsequent to the initiation of
the wrongful death action, defendant Conte impleaded Yonkers
Hospital and an individual associated with the procedures at the
hospital. The third party complaints were dismissed for "patent
fraction of the award - the insurance coverage of the paying prime defendants. The
latter, not having paid more than their equitable shares (N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1402
(McKinney 1976)), were barred from exacting monies from the third party defendants.
Plaintiffs, not having sued the third party defendants originally and not having amended
their complaints to claim against the third party defendants (N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1009
(McKinney 1976)), were precluded from directly or indirectly recovering from the im-
pleaded parties. "To permit a further recovery to these plaintiffs by means of allowing
the respective main defendants to recover from third-party defendants amounts such
main defendants had not yet paid would be, in effect, the casting aside of established
principles codified in the pleading statutes ... " Klinger v. Dudley, 41 N.Y.2d at 370,
361 N.E.2d at 980, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
18. 22 A.D.2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964).
19. Id. at 122-23, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
[Vol. 3:549
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/9
TORT LAW
insufficiency. "20
On appeal, Judge Hopkins commenced his analysis by sum-
marizing the common law rules: joint and several liability of
tortfeasors meant that any one of the joint tortfeasors was an-
swerable for the entire damage; and one tortfeasor-defendant
could not implead a tortfeasor not sued by the plaintiff.21 Ap-
portionment of damages and indemnity, however, were recog-
nized in certain circumstances.22
He perceived the facts in Conte as distinguishable from
"the classic type of joint torts when the injury occurred as a
product of the acts of several wrongdoers in concert, or flowing
from concurrent acts of several wrongdoers happening at the
same time . ,"3 Here there were two separate stages of con-
duct, the original injury to the deceased's hand, and the negli-
gent treatment which occasioned Musco's death. These acts con-
stituted successive and independent, not concurrent, tortious
conduct of different degrees of culpability.2 4 "Hence, the rule
that the impleader of a third party will not lie at the instance of
a tortfeasor in pari delicto fails of application . "..."25 By this
reasoning, Judge Hopkins justified impleader in cases where
tortfeasors acted independently and at different stages and
times, and set the stage for adoption by the New York Court of
Appeals of the doctrine of apportionment.
D. Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.
In Dole, plaintiff charged Dow Chemical with negligence in
causing the death of her husband from exposure to a poisonous
chemical used to fumigate grain storage bins of decedent's em-
ployer. Plaintiff alleged failure by the manufacturer to label
20. Id. at 123, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 592. The reasons advanced by the third party defen-
dants in seeking affirmance of the dismissal were: an active tortfeasor may not implead
another alleged tortfeasor; the statute of limitations had run; and defendant Conte's
complaint was barred by laches. Id.
21. Id. at 123, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
22. Judge Hopkins referred to cases involving concurrent, separate conduct produc-
ing injury to land, and unequal fault. Id. at 124, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
23. Id.
24. Conte, Judge Hopkins observed, could be held liable for the entire damage but
his act was less culpable than that of the third party defendants. Id. at 124, 254 N.Y.S.2d
at 593-94.
25. Id. at 124, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
19831
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properly and warn users of the dangers. Dow denied any negli-
gence and impleaded George Urban Milling Company, dece-
dent's employer, on the theory that Urban's active and primary
negligence caused decedent's death and, consequently, Dow was
entitled to indemnification.26
Dow's pleading and Urban's motion to dismiss the third
party complaint followed the established doctrine that im-
pleader was permitted only where primary or active negligence
could be charged to the third party defendant. A successful im-
pleader would result in indemnification of the third party plain-
tiff by shifting the entire loss to the third party defendant.2 The
difficulty for a defendant in pursuing such "self help" arose from
the vagaries of fixing the meanings of active-passive, and pri-
mary-secondary negligence.
The court of appeals acknowledged that the active-passive
concept represented "an abandonment of the rigorous common-
law policy .".,2, requiring a "measure of degree of differential
culpability, although the degree was a large one."2 9 In re-exam-
ining "the basic fairness of the uncertain and largely unpredict-
able nature of the measure of redress . . by indemnity," 30 the
court resolved that "an apportionment of responsibility in negli-
gence '3 1 achieved a more equitable result.
The court recognized that action by the third party plaintiff
(Dow) against the employer (Urban) was a different claim from
that asserted by the plaintiff representing the estate of the de-
ceased employee. 2 Dow's claim sought a determination of the
relative responsibility of the chemical manufacturer and the em-
ployer based upon the independent duty of the latter to Dow."
26. Dow alleged that Urban failed to follow instructions on the label, failed to test
and aerate the fumigated premises and used untrained personnel. Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d at 145-46, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85.
27. See Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 346
N.E.2d 520, 522-23, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (1976).
28. 30 N.Y.2d at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
29. Id. at 292, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 149, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
32. Id. at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390. Under former N.Y. WORK.
COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965), the plaintiff would have no right of recovery against
her husband's employer.
33. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at
390. See Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y.
[Vol. 3:549
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Consequently, the "[flight to apportionment of liability or to
full indemnity. . . as among parties involved together in caus-
ing damage by negligence, should rest on relative responsibility
and [is] to be determined on the facts." 3 Henceforth, labels
such as active-passive or primary-secondary negligence were not
the criteria for impleader; rather, the procedural bars were dis-
mantled to permit equitable sharing among defendants of dam-
ages due the plaintiff.
The legacy of Dow engaged the courts in measuring ac-
countability by a much more finely calibrated scale. No longer
were 50/50 sharing by contribution or total shifting of loss by
indemnity the only alternatives.35 Henceforth, equitable appor-
tionment among originally joined or impleaded tortfeasors would
be the task of judges and juries.3 '
E. Williams v. Mobil Oil Corp.
A recent personal injury action against two corporate defen-
dants provided the occasion for revisiting the problem of "cor-
relative rights of the defendants between themselves," 7 as
Judge Hopkins expressed it. In Williams v. Mobil Oil Corp.,"
one of the defendants, Pace Oldsmobile, leased a building in
New Rochelle where it sold and serviced automobiles. Incident
175, 180, 15 N.E.2d 567, 568-69 (1938).
34. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at
391-92.
35. A recent analysis of the contribution versus indemnification problem is
presented in Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Dayton Tool & Die Works, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
489, 443 N.E.2d 457, 457 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1982). In that case, workers injured while operat-
ing machinery sued the manufacturers of the equipment. The latter brought third party
actions for contribution or indemnification against the employers.
The liability carriers of the employers disclaimed coverage pursuant to a clause in
the insurance contracts exempting the carriers from any obligation to indemnify an em-
ployer for damages arising out of personal injury to an employee. The carriers argued
that the indemnification clause insulated them from liability for Dole apportionment.
The court, however, emphasized that Dole apportionment has "no application to a claim
for indemnity." Id. at 497, 443 N.E.2d at 460-61, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 212-13. Instead, it was
codified by the legislature to expand the right to contribution. Thus, the indemnity
clause in the insurance contract did not immunize the carriers from Dole apportionment.
36. See Wilner & Farrell, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: The Kaleidoscopic Impact of a
Leading Case, 42 BRooKLN L. REv. 457 (1976).
37. Williams v. Mobil Oil Corp., 83 A.D.2d 434, 435, 445 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (2d Dep't
1981).
38. 83 A.D.2d 434, 455 N.Y.S.2d 172 (2d Dep't 1981).
19831
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to its business, Pace maintained on the premises gasoline pumps
and tanks supplied by the second defendant, Mobil Oil. A Pace
employee detected a strange odor in the basement. Mobil inves-
tigated the possibility of leakage from its gasoline tanks; its en-
gineer found fumes, presumably nonflammable, and arranged for
a contractor to come the following morning to test the gasoline
tanks. Shortly before the anticipated inspection, a Pace em-
ployee activated a sump pump in the basement and a fire
erupted. 9
Firemen injured in fighting the fire sued Pace and Mobil
charging both with negligence. Pace crossclaimed against Mobil
for property damage asserting that Mobil had breached its
equipment loan contract with Pace. Mobil countered with an af-
firmative defense, the twelve month time limitation on claims
prescribed in its retail dealer contract with Pace, and cross-
claimed for indemnity. 0 Both parties moved for summary
judgment.4
Although Judge Hopkins' analysis of the various contract is-
sues posed is deft and instructive, his treatment of the indem-
nity question is here of particular relevance. By this time (1981),
he observed that "the familiar doctrine of Dole . . . sanctioned
by statute (CPLR 1401) . . . [authorizes that] contributions may
be sought by one tort-feasor against another, whether the tort-
feasors are joint, concurrent, or successive .... "I' He con-
cluded that the "all embracing language [of the contracts]
manifests as a matter of law an intent to include indemnity of
losses occasioned even by Mobil's own negligence."'48
The decision in Williams reveals the result of the interac-
tion of the judge in the common law tradition and the legisla-
ture. The Dole doctrine, evolved by the court, embodied in stat-
ute and then worked through numerous, specific factual
39. Id. at 435-36, 445 N.Y.S.2d 173-74.
40. Id. at 436-37, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 174. Both of the contracts between the parties
included an indemnity provision whereby Pace would indemnify Mobil for claims based
upon personal injury and property damage arising out of the use or condition of the
equipment and the storage or handling of the products on the premises. Id. at 438, 445
N.Y.S.2d at 174-75.
41. Id. at 437, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
42. Id. at 441, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
43. Id. at 442, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 177 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 3:549
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configurations, has become settled law, and so it is applied by a
judge who is adroit at integrating a new approach in evaluating
accountability for tortious conduct.
II. The Dole Doctrine and Parental Accountability
A. Parental Immunity
The preceding discussion has traced the demise of rigid
precepts restricting joinder, contribution and indemnity. While
facially appearing to be of a procedural nature, the liberalization
of the rules has produced important, substantive consequences.
The tortfeasor who escaped liability because the plaintiff did not
join him as a defendant or because he was immune from im-
pleader, the employer whose exposure was limited to worker's
compensation insurance - these, among others, may now be ac-
countable for a proportionate share of the damages assessed.
The usefulness of the Dole doctrine invites attempts to ap-
ply it in a variety of situations where it can be asserted that
more than one individual's negligence contributed to cause the
injury. Application to the ordinary tort case involving concur-
rent or successive tortfeasors is no longer a novelty. But what
happens when the liberated procedure of Dole clashes head-on
with the vestiges of an ancient immunity which insulates negli-
gent conduct from liability in tort?
The doctrine of intrafamily immunity shielded spouses, par-
ents and children from legal accountability to each other, at
least for intentional infliction of personal injury. Interspousal
immunity is no longer a part of New York law," but a signifi-
cant residuum of parental immunity persists. It can be traced to
the present.
In Sorrentino v. Sorrentino,41 the court of appeals held that
an action for personal injury which resulted from the negligent
operation of an automobile could not be maintained against a
parent by an unemancipated minor child. The court of appeals
thereafter twice affirmed the doctrine.
44. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-313 (McKinney 1978). For a criticism of the in-
terspousal immunity rule see Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 474-77, 3 N.E.2d 597, 600-01
(1936) (Crouch, J., dissenting).
45. 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E.2d 551 (1928) (overruled in Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23
N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969)).
1983]
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Cannon v. Cannon involved an action by an eleven-year-old
child against his parents for personal injuries caused by the
mother's negligent operation of an automobile." The court of
appeals refused to countenance the claim on the ground that
such an action would be disruptive to family harmony.'
7
Badigian v. Badigian"s rejected the right of a mother, on behalf
of her three-year-old child, to sue the father for injuries result-
ing to the child from the father's negligence in leaving his car
unlocked. But Judge Fuld, dissenting, voiced strong criticism of
a "rule which so incongruously shields conceded wrongdoing
... .-,9He exposed the fallacy of the family harmony justifica-
tion by citing exceptions to the immunity doctrine which "swal-
lowed the rule."'50
B. Gelbman v. Gelbman
A reexamination of intrafamily accountability emerged in
Geibman v. Geibman.5 In that case, the mother-passenger
brought negligence actions against her unemancipated sixteen-
year-old son, driver of her car, and the driver of the second car
involved in the collision. The trial court and the appellate divi-
sion rejected the claim against the son."' But the court of ap-
peals reversed. It rejected the traditional rationale that the im-
munity was essential to family harmony. On the contrary,
observed the court: "[iut seems obvious that family unity can
only be preserved . . . by permitting the present action."'53 The
court noted four anomalous features of the doctrine advanced in
Judge Fuld's Badigian dissent as support for its conclusion: the
doctrine was inapplicable if the child had attained majority, the
46. 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942) (overruled in Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23
N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969)).
47. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. at 428-29, 40 N.E.2d at 237-38.
48. 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961) (overruled in Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969)).
49. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d at 475, 174 N.E.2d at 721, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 38
(Fuld, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 478, 174 N.E.2d at 722, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 40 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
51. 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
52. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 52 Misc. 2d 412, 275 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1966), aff'd, 28 A.D.2d 826, 282 N.Y.S.2d 670 (2d Dep't 1967), rev'd, 23 N.Y.2d
434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
53. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d at 437, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
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suit was for property damage, the action was for an intentional
tort, or the suit arose as a result of an automobile accident
which occurred in the course of employment."' The court realis-
tically acknowledged that New York's compulsory automobile
insurance law" would protect the family unit from economic
hardship should the plaintiff recover damages; in fact, a success-
ful outcome would supply funds to provide for the care of the
injured family member. Although renouncing "the defense of in-
trafamily tort immunity for nonwillful torts," 56 the court dis-
claimed "creating liability where none previously existed. '57 The
immunity had simply operated to shield a liability which, but
for the family relationship, would have attached to the negligent
conduct.
Geibman thus stripped negligent conduct in the operation
of a vehicle from its former legal protection when the operator
and the injured party were members of the same family. The
presence of liability insurance was a persuasive consideration in
reaching this result. Far more sensitive and disturbing, socially
and economically, was the issue of accountability of a parent for
injuries sustained by a child when negligence in guarding the
safety of the child appeared to be a contributing cause.
Following the Geibman decision, three judicial departments
of the appellate division had occasion to consider parental ac-
countability for negligent supervision of a child. The result was
uniform: a cause of action based on a theory of parental negli-
gence would not be entertained.
C. Holodook, Graney and Ryan Decisions
The third department, in 1973, decided two cases: Holodook
v. Spencer" and Graney v. Graney." In Holodook, the father
sued the owner and operator of the vehicle which struck and in-
jured his four-year-old child. The defendant, in turn, impleaded
54. Id. at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
55. N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 670-78 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
56. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d at 439, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
57. Id.
58. 43 A.D.2d 129, 250 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1973), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324
N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
59. 43 A.D.2d 207, 350 N.Y.S.2d 207 (3d Dep't 1973), aff'd sub nom. Holodook v.
Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
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the mother and counterclaimed against the father on the theory
that their negligence in failing to watch over the child was a con-
tributing cause of the injury."0 Defendant invoked the Dole ap-
portionment doctrine to impose a share of the damages upon the
parents. 1 The appellate division rejected defendant's attempt to
hold the parents accountable stating that:
The duty to supervise a child in his daily activities has as its ob-
jective the fostering of physical, emotional and intellectual devel-
opment, and is one whose enforcement can depend only on
love.... Surely there can be no place in such a natural scheme
for second-guessing by a jury whose members' views on the sub-
ject will be unavoidably influenced by their own unique and inim-
itable experiences, both as children and parents.2
Similarly, in Graney, the third department refused to recog-
nize the legal responsibility of a father for injuries to his young
son sustained in a fall while under the father's care. 3 However,
Justice Staley, in dissent, asserted that a parent's duty to exer-
cise reasonable care to protect his infant had long been recog-
nized in the law. He would hav6 sustained a cause of action for
negligent supervision, holding a parent to the standard of the
"ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent.""
The fourth judicial department, in Ryan v. Fahey,65 consid-
ered the action by a father against the mother of his three-year-
old son who was injured while under her supervision." In accord
with the previous third department rulings, it dismissed the
complaint.
60. Holodook v. Spencer, 43 A.D.2d at 130-31, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
61. Id. at 131, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
62. Id. at 135, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 204-05.
63. Graney v. Graney, 43 A.D.2d at 208, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
64. Id. at 210, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (Staley, J., dissenting).
65. 43 A.D.2d 429, 352 N.Y.S.2d 283 (4th Dep't), aff'd sub nom. Holodook v. Spen-
cer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
66. Id. at 430, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
67. In dismissing the complaint, the majority adopted the Wisconsin approach of
permitting negligence suits by children against their parents in non-parental authority or
discretion cases, such as automobile cases. Id. at 435-36, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 289. See Goller
v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). See generally Hollister, Parent-Child
Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. RaV. 489, 512-16 (1980)
(discussion of the Wisconsin Goller approach and its application in other jurisdictions).
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D. Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc.
It finally devolved upon the second department to consider
the issue: "Does lack of supervision of an unemancipated child
by his parents, as a result of which he is injured, constitute an
actionable tort?" 8 The facts in Lastowski revealed that a four-
year-old child was struck and injured on a public highway by a
motor vehicle owned by Norge. The infant's father sued the
driver and Norge to recover for his son's injuries and for medical
expenses and loss of companionship. Defendants counter-
claimed, seeking a Dole apportionment of damages on the theory
that the father's failure to safeguard his son was culpable con-
duct. Plaintiffs asserted that such a counterclaim was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law. 9 A majority of the appellate division
bench agreed.70
Justice Shapiro, writing for the court, confirmed the posi-
tion taken by the other departments, that a cause of action in
tort against a parent for negligent supervision of a child did not
exist."1 He drew upon the language in Cannon which elaborated
the view that the law accords parents wide discretion in provid-
ing for the support, education, recreation and health of a child:
In the exercise of that discretion and the performance of duties
imposed by law through no choice by the parents, they are held to
no higher standard of care than the measure of their own physi-
cal, mental and financial abilities to provide for the well-being of
their child. Lack of means, physical weakness or mental incapac-
68. Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 127, 355 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d
Dep't 1974).
69. Id. at 127-28, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
70. The court divided 3-2 in Lastowaki, Gulotta, P.J. and Hopkins, J. dissenting in
separate opinions. Id. at 151, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
71. It should be noted that the second department rendered its decision in Lastow-
ski before the court of appeals issued its opinion affirming Holodook, Graney and Ryan.
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). The court
of appeals confined Gelbman to the types of claims which would be actionable if no
family relationship existed, e.g., injured passenger versus negligent driver. If claims for
negligent supervision were recognized, the court cautioned that only an insured parent
would sue on behalf of his injured child because he would be the object of a counterclaim
by the non-parent defendant. Id. at 44-51, 324 N.E.2d at 342-46, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866-72.
But this ignores the fact that under Dole, a parent could be impleaded for apportion-
ment purposes. Judge Jasen, dissenting, advocated application of a standard of reasona-
ble care and assessment of comparative fault. Id. at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d
at 872 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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ity may cause parents to tolerate conditions in the family home
which are unsafe and which might afford a basis for liability to
one coming to the premises as an invitee or licensee.72
Justice Shapiro then reviewed the dissenting opinion of Judge
Fuld in Badigian 7 and the majority opinion of Judge Burke in
Gelbman7 4 emphasizing the insurance factor in both of these au-
tomobile injury cases. He concluded that "Gelbman, in erasing
the ban against intrafamily suits, did not create a cause of ac-
tion based upon lack of parental supervision. '75 Neither was the
majority in Lastowski disposed to create such a cause of action.
The reasons supporting the court's refusal recalled the fa-
miliar family unity theme; litigation, costs and the burden of a
judgment against a parent would dissipate family financial re-
sources and create strife. Differences in children, in the capacity
of parents, in the conditions of the home, in cultural back-
grounds and economic environments would make it impossible
to construct a standard of care for parental supervision. To rec-
ognize such a cause of action would pervert the purposes of
Gelbman and Dole and would have an "in terrorem effect" on
parents."
Judge Hopkins dissented; in departing from what had been
demonstrated to be the conventional wisdom of appellate courts
in New York," he explored the precedents and offered several
possible formulations of parental accountability. 78 Although the
theory of imputed negligence has been proscribed in New York
in actions on behalf of an injured child,79 its prior use evidenced
72. Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d at 129-30, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 435
(quoting Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. at 428-29, 40 N.E.2d at 237-38).
73. 9 N.Y.2d at 479, 174 N.E.2d at 722-23, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
74. 23 N.Y.2d at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
75. Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d at 131, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 437
(emphasis added).
76. Id. at 136-37, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
77. The Holodook, Graney and Ryan appellate division decisions were affirmed by
the New York Court of Appeals, see supra note 71.
78. He noted that the counterclaim could have been sustained at this (the pleading)
stage since the parent had not denied all legal responsibility for supervision but had
challenged the counterclaim because it did not allege that that the infant required "un-
usual supervision." In Judge Hopkins' view, a four-year-old child, by implication, re-
quires unusual supervision. Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d at 137, 355
N.Y.S.2d at 443 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
79. N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAw § 3-11 (McKinney 1978), provides that the negligence of a
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recognition of a legal duty of parental care owing to a child.80
Gelbman removed the defense of intrafamily immunity and the
Dole decision supplied the rationale justifying parental
accountability:
[I]t is not just to burden the defendant, even though negligent,
with all the burden of the damages, if the parent's negligence con-
tributed to the injury. The child is not punished for the parent's
sins by the adoption of this rule, for the child will receive the
benefit of the whole recovery. If the parent is punished by the
apportionment of the recovery, it is because of his own conduct
and the inequity of allowing him to escape scot-free at the ex-
pense of the joint tortfeasor. . . . Once the parent's duty to care
for and supervise the child is established as part of the parent's
general responsibility, then it must follow that the negligent dis-
charge of that duty -as it follows in the instance of any other
legal duty - results in liability for the damages ensuing. 1
Abrogation of parental immunity in itself does not provide
the appropriate standard for judging whether or not a parent
has been negligent. Judge Hopkins examined the liability rule in
two states which had abolished the immunity. The Wisconsin
rule, he observed, exempts from liability negligent acts associ-
ated with reasonable exercise of parental authority and ordinary
discretion in providing food, housing, medical and other care.82
He concluded that these exceptions, "phrased in vague and ab-
stract terms," had proven difficult to interpret and created un-
certainty in the law. 8
California, on the other hand, adopted the standard of a
reasonable parent in Gibson v. Gibson." Cutting through the
parent or custodian may not be imputed to an infant in an infant's action seeking dam-
ages for personal injury.
80. Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d at 139, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 445
(Hopkins, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 140-41, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 141-42, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 446-48. See Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413,
122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); accord Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis.
2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972).
83. Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d at 141, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 447
(Hopkins, J., dissenting).
84. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). Justice Sullivan first laid to
rest, in unequivocal terms, the doctrine of parental immunity: "We have concluded that
parental immunity has become a legal anachronism.... Lacking the support of author-
ity and reason, the rule must fall." Id.
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outworn barriers to liability, the California court prescribed as
"the proper test of a parent's conduct. : what would an ordi-
narily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar
circumstances?" 8'
Such a formulation of parental responsibility, in Judge
Hopkins' opinion, could take special circumstances into account:
age, incapacity, handicaps. The trier of fact could enforce com-
munity standards and could reflect "the reluctance to overtax
the parent with a duty that cannot easily be met."' It would,
finally, "accord with the spirit of fairness which Dole v. Dow
Chem. embraces. 8 7 For all of these reasons, Judge Hopkins ad-
vocated a fresh evaluation of an artificial limitation on accounta-
bility for tortious conduct.
He is not alone in refusing to be bound by precepts of the
past. The rule of parental immunity, as Justice Sullivan sur-
veyed its history in Gibson, is only eighty years old and "an in-
vention of American courts" 8 ; it bears reassessment if for no
other reasons than that the exceptions engrafted on the rule
have emasculated it. Interspousal immunity, a doctrine to which
it is compared, traces its roots much deeper into the early com-
mon law, yet modern courts and legislatures, including those of
New York, have found its rationale no longer persuasive. In sup-
porting a similar demise for parental immunity, Judge Hopkins
aligns himself with the great tort scholars, Professors Prosser
and James,89 an enviable alliance, but, after all, a reflection on
his superior insight and appreciation of the office of a judge in
moving the law foward.
III. The Enigmas of Statutes of Limitations
The treatment of statute of limitations perplexities is an ex-
ample par excellence of Judge Hopkins' deftness in parsing the
law. The Civil Practice Law and Rules devotes Article 2 to the
subject "Limitations of Time." Here, one finds not only various
85. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
86. Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d at 143, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 916, 479 P.2d at 649, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
89. PRossm, supra note 1, at 865; James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Im-
pact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 553 (1948).
[Vol. 3:549
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/9
TORT LAW
stays, tolls and other special provisions but also classifications of
causes of action governed by specific time periods.90 So much is
(relatively) clear. But when does the time limitation begin to
run? When does one activate the stop watch?
Section 203(a), "Accrual of cause of action and interposition
of claim", announces, delphically, "The time within which an ac-
tion must be commenced,.. . shall be computed from the time
the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed."
Although the section obliges with particulars of when a claim is
interposed,1 it does not illuminate the term "accrual." A sam-
pling of Judge Hopkins' decisions in statute of limitations cases
illustrates his skill in supplying the judicial gloss essential to in-
terpreting the accrual of a cause of action. 2
A. Siegel v. Kranis
The precedential case of Siegel v. Kranis5 involved an au-
tomobile accident on February 15, 1960 in which three family
members in the Siegel car were injured as a result of the alleged
negligence of the driver of the other car. The attorney engaged
by plaintiffs filed a claim with the Motor Vehicle Accident In-
demnification Corporation for uninsured motorist coverage on
August 11, 1960, well beyond the statutory 90 day period mea-
sured from the time of the accident." Following various mesne
proceedings, a jury decided on September 23, 1965 that the
claim filed by the attorney was untimely.95
90. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 211 (McKinney 1976) (twenty-year limitation
on money judgments); id. § 213 (six-year limitation on certain contract actions); id. § 214
(three-year limitation for injury to person or property, etc.).
91. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 203(b), (c) & (e) (McKinney 1976).
92. See, e.g., Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1968).
93. Id. The second car was not registered, and presumably not insured, by its owner.
Hence plaintiffs' claim would be filed with the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation. Id. at 478, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
94. Siegel v. Kranis, 52 Misc. 2d 78, 274 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1966).
95. Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d at 479, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833. The standard of care
required of an attorney is set forth in Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144
(1954) (the professional must possess the requisite learning and skill and exert his best
judgment), and is consistent with the standard for physicians, Pike v. Honsinger, 155
N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898). Wilful malfeasance (deceit, collusion, delaying suit or re-
ceiving money for personal gain) is a crime exposing an attorney to liability for treble
damages in a civil suit. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 487(1)-(2) (McKinney 1983). The dissatisfied
client suing his attorney for malpractice shoulders a heavy burden: the plaintiff in a legal
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Plaintiffs commenced a suit against their attorney on June
17, 1966 for malpractice.96 The issue was whether plaintiffs'
cause of action accrued on May 15, 1960, the date by which the
claim against MVAIC should have been filed, or September 23,
1965, the date of the jury's decision adverse to plaintiffs. If the
former interpretation prevailed, even the six year contract limi-
tation would have run. If the 1965 date governed accrual, plain-
tiffs' suit against the attorney in 1966 was timely.
Judge Hopkins embarked upon his analysis by noting that
in medical malpractice cases the date of the act or omission no
longer constituted an inflexible rule for commencement of the
applicable limitation period. The continuous treatment excep-
tion formulated by the court of appeals in Borgia v. City of New
York appeared "equally applicable in the context of litigation by
attorneys. ' '11
The client, like the patient, must depend on the profes-
sional's knowledge, skill and judgment. In the course of pursuing
a claim through procedural stages, the client could not reasona-
bly be expected to interrupt the litigation and sue his attorney.
In the instant case, the conclusive rejection of plaintiffs' claim
because of late filing did not occur until September 1965, and it
was then that the issue of attorney negligence, for failure to ini-
tiate his client's action within the governing time limitation,
could logically be raised. That date served as a terminus to the
preceding five year period when a client-attorney relationship
had persisted with reference to plaintiffs' personal injury claims.
Consequently, the malpractice action accrued when a jury defin-
itively found that the claim was not filed within the mandatory
90 day period.
Judge Hopkins reasoned:
[A] contrary rule .. .might well lead to procrastination by the
malpractice action for failure to prosecute properly a cause of action, must first show
that the "action which has been neglected would probably have been successful, and,
therefore that its neglect has directly resulted in damages measured by the value or
amount of the rights which were lost by the default." McAleenan v. Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co., 232 N.Y. 199, 204-05, 133 N.E. 444, 446 (1921).
96. Siegel v. Kranis, 52 Misc. 2d at 79, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
97. Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1962). For application of the continuous treatment theory in a recent
case, see Lomber v. Farrow, 91 A.D.2d 727, 457 N.Y.S.2d 638 (3d Dep't 1982).
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attorney to postpone the inevitable event of defeat. The author of
the disaster should not be enabled to chart the strategy to avoid
the liability for his own negligence. Otherwise, negligence could
be disguised by the device of delay, and an attorney rewarded by
immunity from the consequence of his negligence."
By such convincing parallelism, the continuous treatment doc-
trine was extended in New York to attorneys.9 Could the doc-
trine logically encompass accountability of other professionals as
well?
B. Cubito v. Kreisberg
The conceptual foundation for determining the appropriate
statute of limitations applicable to a malpractice action by a
third party against an architect received careful scrutiny in
Cubito v. Kreisberg.100 Plaintiff was injured in a fall on October
30, 1974 in the laundry room of her apartment house. She
charged defendant architect with negligence in design, resulting
in accumulation of water on the floor of the room. The architect
planning the construction had issued his certificate of comple-
tion on May 7, 1973 to the owners of the building. Plaintiff's
action was commenced on October 6, 1977, more than three
years from the certification of the architect's work.10' Defendant
moved to dismiss on the ground that the three year malpractice
statute of limitations had run."' The issue, therefore, centered
on the determination of when plaintiff's cause of action accrued.
Judge Hopkins, in affirming the denial of defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss, focused his analysis on the nature and accrual of
the cause of action to reach his conclusion as to the applicable
statute of limitations. He noted a basic distinction between stat-
utory malpractice and ordinary negligence claims. The former
"describes the negligence of a professional toward the person for
whom he rendered a service, and . . . springs from the correla-
tive rights and duties assumed by the parties through the rela-
98. Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d at 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
99. For a recent application of Judge Hopkins' decisions, see Glamm v. Allen, 57
N.Y.2d 87, 439 N.E.2d 390, 453 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1982).
100. 69 A.D.2d 738, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578 (2d Dep't 1979).
101. Id. at 738, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
102. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 214(6) (McKinney 1976).
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tionship."' 5 By contrast, "simple negligence" relates to "the
wrongful conduct of the professional in rendering services to his
client resulting in injury to a party outside the relationship
... ," Since the injured plaintiff in Cubito had the status of a
third party and not a client of the architect, her claim consti-
tuted an action for simple negligence.
This crucial distinction served as the predicate for deter-
mining the point at which the action accrued for purposes of the
statute of limitations. In a negligence action, the three year pe-
riod commences when "the wrongful invasion of personal rights
occurred . . ."10 Accordingly, plaintiff's action accrued when
she fell and was injured, and her suit was timely commenced
within the three year period provided for personal injury ac-
tions.""e By this reasoning, plaintiff's claim did not suffer defeat
by application of the accepted principle that a cause of action by
a client against an architect for faulty design or construction ac-
crues when the construction is completed. 10 7
Hypothetically, had Cubito involved an architect-client re-
lationship, the client's action for any professional negligence oc-
curring during the entire period of the architect's services on a
particular project could await the completion of the architect's
association with the project; thus the client would have the ben-
efit of the continuous treatment rule adapted from Borgia to
other professionals by Judge Hopkins' decision in Siegel.
103. Cubito v. Kreisberg, 69 A.D.2d at 742, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
104. Id. Cf. Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. Rock-
land County 1973), aff'd, 43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 954 (2d Dep't 1974) (a third
party who would have benefitted had an attorney carried out his client's wishes does not
have a claim against the attorney); but cf. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161,
74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
105. Cubito v. Kreisberg, 69 A.D.2d at 743, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 581 (citing Schmidt v.
Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300, 200 N.E. 824, 831 (1936)).
106. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 214 (McKinney 1976).
107. Cubito v. Kreisberg, 69 A.D.2d at 744, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 581 (citing Soenow v.
Paul, 43 A.D.2d 978, 352 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 780, 330 N.E.2d
643, 369 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1975)); In re Paver & Wildfoerster [Catholic High School Ass'n),
38 N.Y.2d 669, 345 N.E.2d 565, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco
Ass'n, 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977)). For the rule applicable
to accountants, see Chemical Bank v. Louis Sternbach & Co., 91 A.D.2d 518, 456
N.Y.S.2d 392 (lst Dep't 1982) (plaintiffs action was not timely having been commenced
more than three years after the accountant's certified statements had been received and
relied upon).
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The continuous treatment, or more appropriately "the con-
tinuous professional service to a client in the same matter of
consultation," rule may logically be applied to architects; how-
ever the facts of the Cubito case did not provide the occasion.
The introduction of a third party, not the client of the profes-
sional, cast the circumstances in a different mold. What is signif-
icant as a result of Judge Hopkins' decision is that third parties
injured as a result of a professional's breach of duty have a claim
for negligence accruing at the time that the injury is incurred.
C. Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases
The continuous treatment rule is one of two major excep-
tions to the principle that a malpractice action accrues when the
negligent act occurs. The other is the foreign objects rule devel-
oped in Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital:'"s a cause
of action for medical malpractice accrues when the patient dis-
covers the presence of a foreign object negligently left at the site
of an operation. Forgotten surgical instruments or other material
associated with an invasive procedure may be totally concealed;
the negligent failure to remove them will not usually be known
to the patient unless he is x-rayed or undergoes subsequent sur-
gery. The object is real evidence of the neglience and "there is
no possible causal break between the negligence of the doctor or
hospital and the patient's injury."'" For those reasons, the pa-
tient's claim for damages accrues when the object is discovered
or could have been reasonably discovered. A fair rule - but how
far may it be expanded to encompass discovery of errors not in-
volving foreign objects?
Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases'" presents an at-
tempt to stretch the rule. During plaintiff's hospitalization for
surgery in 1959, a specimen of tissue was submitted to defen-
dant's department of pathology for examination. The diagnosis
108. 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431, 248 N.E.2d 871, 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 27 (1969). Surgical
clamps were left in the plaintiff's abdomen during surgery in 1958. Eight years later,
when plaintiff was x-rayed in an effort to diagnose the cause of abdominal pains, the
presence of the clamps were discovered. Id. at 428, 248 N.E.2d at 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d at
24.
109. Id. at 430, 248 N.E.2d at 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
110. 36 A.D.2d 31, 319 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't 1971), leave to appeal denied, 29
N.Y.2d 483, 273 N.E.2d 577, 324 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1971).
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indicated malignancy. Plaintiff allegedly received radiation ther-
apy thereafter. In 1967, the biopsy slides were reviewed and
plaintiff was informed that no malignancy had been present. In
1969, almost two years after the discovery, Schiffman sued the
hospital for damages.111
The hospital's motion to dismiss was granted on the ground
that the action was untimely, not commenced within three years
from the accrual date of 1959. Plaintiff relied on the Flanagan
holding and on Murphy v. St. Charles Hospital'1 2 with its pur-
ported extension of Flanagan."' The Murphy case concerned a
prosthesis inserted in the patient's hip in 1963; the prosthesis
broke four years later. The patient's malpractice suit brought in
1968 was not barred by the statute of limitations. The court ob-
served that the prosthesis (presumably negligently implanted)
was similar to a foreign object in that it was preserved as evi-
dence in the body and negated the opportunity for false claims;
plaintiff's claim accrued in 1967 when the prosthesis broke and
she sustained injury. "
Judge Hopkins concluded that neither the Flanagan nor the
Murphy decision supported application of the foreign objects
exception to the Schiffman case. No foreign object was left in
the body; the existence of the biopsy slides was known to the
patient, hence there was no unfairness due to concealment. "The
claim of negligence relates to a misdiagnosis of ailment, an area
of the physician-patient relationship not touched by the Flana-
gan holding." ' The lapse of ten years since the diagnosis would
dim defendants' recollection; in addition, such an extension of
time might force defendants to meet claims based upon ad-
vanced technology, unavailable at the time of the treatment.
These considerations assessed against the fact pattern in Schiff-
man convinced Judge Hopkins to refuse enlargement of the for-
eign objects exception and to follow the general rule that the
period of limitations runs from the commission of the negligent
111. Id. at 31-32, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
112. 35 A.D.2d 64, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970).
113. Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases, 36 A.D.2d at 32-34, 319 N.Y.S.2d at
675-78.
114. Murphy v. St. Charles Hosp., 35 A.D.2d at 65-66, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 979-80.
115. Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases, 36 A.D.2d at 33, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
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act and not from the discovery of the wrong.""
A line had to be drawn, and in Judge Hopkins' view,
stretching the exception beyond Flanagan and Murphy raised
delicate issues touching the respective roles of courts and legisla-
tures in changing an established rule of law.'7
D. Musco v. Conte
Where the statute of limitations is silent or abstruse, judges
must fill the void, by analogy and ingenuity. A case in point (and
discussed more fully in Part II) is Musco v. Conte"" which,
among other issues, involved a question of when a cause of ac-
tion for indemnity accrued. Defendant Conte had served a third
party complaint nearly five years after the action against him
was commenced and while it was still pending. The third party
defendants argued that defendant was barred by the three-year
malpractice limitation, running from the time of the plaintiff's
injury.119 If this contention were valid, a defendant who did not
quickly implead other possible tortfeasors would forfeit indem-
nification, even if his culpability, compared to the others, were
slight. A decision which would clarify and settle the law on this
issue was obviously necessary.
Judge Hopkins' analysis and resolution of the question in
Musco injected certainty and guidance into an area left indeter-
minate by the Practice Act. He explained:
[a]n action for indemnity need not take the form of third-party
relief; it may be brought as an independent action subsequent to
the rendition of judgment against a tort-feasor .... The general
rule is established that the action accrues not at the time of the
commission of the tort for which indemnity is sought, but at the
time of the payment of the judgment... ; and this rule applies as
well to third-party complaints .... I"
116. Id. at 33-34, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 676-77. "We do not think we should further con-
tract the general rule applicable to diagnostic negligence by marking the beginning of
time permitted for the commencement of an action for malpractice by the date of the
the patient's discovery of the physician's negligence." Id. at 33, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
117. See conclusions infra note 137 and accompanying text.
118. 22 A.D.2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964).
119. Id. at 123, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 592. For discussion of the substantive implications
of this position, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
120. Musco v. Conte, 22 A.D.2d at 125-26, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
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It is possible that an indemnity action, whether brought in-
dependently or by a third party complaint, may be initiated long
after the tortious act causing plaintiff's harm and prove inconve-
nient and difficult to defend.12 This problem is less likely to
arise now that the Dole apportionment doctrine1 2 2 has become
so firmly entrenched in New York law, and a defendant's attor-
ney will, presumably, exhaust every possible avenue for sharing
his client's liability with others. But where a genuine action for
indemnity is interposed, Judge Hopkins' determination in
Musco survives as a sound precedent.
E. Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Jamaica Water Supply
Co.
A precise statutory analysis yielding an eminently logical
and intelligent result characterizes one of Judge Hopkins' most
recent decisions. Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Jamaica
Water Supply Co.12S raised the question of the time limitation
governing a no-fault insurer's claim to recover first party bene-
fits paid to its insured, a covered person. 124
The automobile operator insured by Safeco for first party,
no-fault benefits was injured in March, 1977 when his car struck
a metal plate in a street where the Jamaica Water Supply Com-
pany was working. No-fault reparations of $50,000 were paid to
him by Safeco. Plaintiff commenced an action against Jamaica
121. Judge Hopkins noted that a court has discretion to determine whether a third
party action will prejudice any party or delay plaintiff's claim. Id. at 126, 254 N.Y.S.2d at
595 (referring to N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 1010 (McKinney 1976)).
122. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
123. 83 A.D.2d 427, 444 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep't 1981), a,1'd, 57 N.Y.2d 994, 443
N.E.2d 493, 457 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1982).
124. Id. at 427, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 926. Under New York's Compulsory Automobile
Insurance Reparations Act, N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 670-78 (McKinney Supp. 1982), the owner
of a properly insured motor vehicle is a "covered person," (id. § 671(10)), entitled to a
maximum of $50,000 per person in benefits from his own insurer for basic economic loss
resulting from an accident. Id. § 671(1). A covered person also enjoys immunity from tort
liability for $50,000 of basic economic loss; his immunity may extend to economic losses
in excess of $50,000 as well as to psychic (noneconomic) damages if plaintiff does not
meet the requirements of a serious injury (id. § 671(4)) threshold. Id. § 673(1). When a
covered person's injury is caused by a noncovered person or entity, the latter is not pro-
tected by any tort immunity and is subject to a traditional negligence action by the
injured party for economic and noneconomic loss. Id. § 673(2).
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for personal injuries.'2 5 Safeco, in turn, notified Jamaica's in-
surer that it claimed a lien on any monies recovered by the mo-
torist in his suit against Jamaica. 2 '
To resolve the issue of whether Safeco could impose a lien
on any award he obtained in his personal injury action, the in-
jured motorist demanded arbitration in November, 1978. The
arbitrator's decision, confirmed by the supreme court in Septem-
ber, 1979, denied Safeco's asserted lien on the ground that the
motorist's suit was not to recover basic economic loss, that is,
not to duplicate the loss paid by Safeco under its no-fault repa-
rations obligation.2 7
Nonetheless, in October, 1980, Safeco instituted this action
against Jamaica to recover first party benefits it had paid to the
motorist. Jamaica moved to dismiss on the ground that the ac-
tion was barred by the three year statute of limitations.' Spe-
cial term held the action timely on the ground that the statute
provided a two year toll for a subrogee-insurer. 2 s On appeal to
the appellate division, Judge Hopkins agreed that Safeco was
not barred by the statute of limitations, but his reasoning rested
upon a different and intricate interpretation of the controlling
law. 1 0
The operative provisions of New York's no-fault law on
which the timeliness of Safeco's assertion of a lien turned' 3 1
prescribe:
In any action by... a covered person, against a noncovered per-
son. . . an insurer which paid or is liable for first party benefits
... shall have a lien against any recovery to the extent of bene-
fits paid or payable by it to the covered person. . . . The failure
of such person to commence such action within two years after
125. To be entitled to sue Jamaica in tort, after receiving the limit for economic loss
reparations under New York's no-fault law, the motorist must have sustained a qualify-
ing serious injury, or Jamaica was a noncovered person. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ja-
maica Water Supply Co., 83 A.D.2d at 429-30, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27.
126. Id. at 428, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 926. Plaintiff also sued the City of New York, but
that defendant was not involved in the present case. Id.
127. Id. at 428-29, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 926. See supra note 124.
128. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 214 (McKinney 1976).
129. N.Y. INs. LAW § 673(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
130. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jamaica Water Supply Co., 83 A.D.2d at 429, 444
N.Y.S.2d at 926.
131. N.Y. INs. LAW § 673(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
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the accrual thereof shall operate to give the insurer a cause of
action for the amount of first party benefits . . . against any per-
son. . . for his personal injuries, which cause of action shall be in
addition to the cause of action of the covered person .... 132
Judge Hopkins examined the purposes of the statute, the
nature of the insurer's cause of action and the question of ac-
crual. In granting an insurer a lien for first party benefits "paid
or payable," the legislature sought to preclude a double recovery
of such benefits by the insured and to preserve the insurer's
right to sue if the insured failed to pursue his claim within two
years.33
The statute, furthermore, created an independent cause of
action on behalf of the insurer, rather than a derivative claim in
the nature of subrogation.3" Judge Hopkins perceived that
Safeco in asserting its lien was not in the position of a subrogee,
but suing in its own right based upon the cause of action estab-
lished by the statute. " 5 Accordingly, Safeco's rights were not
bound by the insured motorist's rights, including the time limi-
tation which would have governed interposition of a claim by
the motorist.136
Unraveling the nature of the insurer's claim, however, did
not resolve whether or not his suit was timely. What removed
the case from the ordinary pattern was not only that a relatively
new statute and its interpretation were involved, but also that
this statute created a cause of action and simultaneously pre-
scribed a specific time period - two years - of abeyance for that
action. But, when did the insurer's claim accrue? Judge Hopkins
132. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jamaica Water Supply Co., 83 A.D.2d at 431, 444
N.Y.S.2d at 928.
133. Id. at 432, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 928. Special Term had viewed Safeco's action as
predicated on a theory of subrogation which would subject the claim to all defenses,
including the statute of limitations, which might be raised against the motorist. Id. at
429, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
134. Judge Hopkins pointed to the provision "that the insurer may sue for first-
party benefits 'paid or payable.' At common law, a right of subrogation does not come
into existence until the insurer has actually paid the debt owing. . . and liability to pay
alone did not permit the insurer to sue . . . ." Id. at 432, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
135. Id. at 433, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 929. At the point in time when Safeco sued on its
lien (October, 1980), the three-year limitation would have barred a negligence action by
the motorist, since the injury had occurred in March, 1977.
136. Id.
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reasoned that two requirements had to be met before the insurer
might sue: (a) two years must have elapsed since the date of the
insured's injury, and (b) during that period, the insured must
not have brought an action for first party benefits. Once these
conditions were satisfied, the insurer could sue within the usual
time limitation - in this case, three years. The insurer's action,
commenced more than two years and less than five years from
the date of the injury was, therefore, timely.
The Safeco decision contributes another example of skilled
technique in application of a relatively new statutory provision.
Section 673 of the New York Comprehensive Automobile Insur-
ance Reparations Act creates a cause of action and at the same
time supplies a specifically tailored statute of limitations; it thus
adds another dimension to the analysis of the issue of timeliness.
The central and most difficult problem remains that of accrual.
Here it is that after parsing the statute, the judge must become
a glossator.
Safeco and the other cases discussed above, illustrate the
degree of intellect and patience demanded of a judge exploring
the labyrinthine passages of the statute of limitations. But the
light ultimately revealed is essential for the guidance of lawyers.
And when that revelation, as in Safeco, is the product of impec-
cable logic, what more can a reviewing court do than declare:
"Order affirmed. . . for reasons stated in the opinion by former
Justice James D. Hopkins ....
Conclusion
Whether construing a recently enacted statute as a matter
of first impression (Safeco), or extending or declining to extend
a rule enlarging the period of accountability for negligence
(Siegel, Schiffman), whether reevaluating a common law immu-
nity (Lastowski), or interpreting and applying a concept of equi-
table apportionment of liability among tortfeasors (Musco) - in
all of these pursuits, Judge Hopkins was keenly aware of the in-
terpretive and revisionist role of the courts. He appreciated the
separation of governmental powers and the need to maintain a
137. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jamaica Water Supply Co., 57 N.Y.2d 994, 996, 443
N.E.2d 493, 493, 457 N.Y.S.2d 245, 245 (1982).
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delicate balance between legislatures and courts in modifying es-
tablished rules of law.138
A judge must decide the case before him, how much to re-
dress the plaintiff's injury, how far to shield the defendant from
limitless liability. "We draw an uncertain and wavering line, but
draw it we must as best we can."139 Judge Hopkins seems to
have been able always to draw the line, on legal grounds, on
pragmatic grounds and on policy grounds. Doubtless, many have
lauded Judge Hopkins as a judge's judge and a lawyer's lawyer;
let it also be said, he is a scholar's delight.
138. A paragraph of his opinion in Schiffman illustrates Judge Hopkins' perception:
We reach this determination apart from our role as an intermediate appellate
court which must take its guidelines from the court of last resort. It is extremely
doubtful whether that role would allow us to depart further from the traditional
view of the Statute of Limitations than Flanagan sanctions; a question of public
policy in the interpretation of the statute and the balance between the Legislature
and the courts in changing a rule of law is plainly raised, which the close division
of the votes of the members of the court in Flanagan demonstrates.
Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases, 36 A.D.2d at 33, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
139. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 354, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (An-
drews, J., dissenting).
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